二十世纪的现实主义首先由摩尔、罗素和其他人提出，指直接或间接(表征)知识的认识论。对安德森来说，这样的区别是错误的:现实主义只能是对客体直接认识的认识论。安德森的现实主义认识论认为，在任何知识的关系中，都有三个截然不同的部分:一个知识的主体或“认识者”(-er);知识或“已知”的对象(-ed);和认识本身的关系，认识(-ing)从现实主义的分析来看，这种关系具有逻辑形式的S/r/O;此外，关系的每个部分——S、r、O或-er、-ing、-ed——与其他部分不同，不能被还原到任何其他部分。在这种情况下，主体与客体之间的认识关系必须是直接的、直接的。此外，在美国新现实主义者之后，安德森认为，这种认识论背后的逻辑是对外关系学说，即在任何关系a/R/b中，“a”和“b”的关系术语是独立存在的，它们之间的关系“R”是独立存在的。在安德森看来，试图识别事物与事物本身的关系就是犯相对论的错误。在这一观点上，任何试图确定或减少对主体或客体的认识的关系的企图，都是由于无法保持知识关系的各个部分的特殊性而使知识成为不可能的。安德森这种观点的另一个更深层次的含义是，主体或客体的性质不能由它所具有的关系构成。因此，品质和关系之间有绝对的区别。再一次，试图识别或降低一个事物的性质与这些性质之间的关系是犯相对主义的错误。这种对相对主义的批判是安徒生系统的现实主义哲学中最常用的手法。
英国哲学论文代写:二十世纪的现实主义
Twentieth century Realism as first articulated by Moore, Russell, and others referred to either an epistemology of direct or indirect (representational) knowledge. For Anderson, such a distinction was false: Realism could only be an epistemology of the direct knowledge of the object. Anderson’s Realist epistemology was the view that in any relationship of knowledge, there are three distinct parts: a subject of knowledge or ‘knower’ (the –er); an object of knowledge or ‘known’ (the –ed); and the relation of knowing itself, the knowing (the –ing). On a Realist analysis, such a relationship had the logical form ‘S/r/O’; further, each part of the relationship – the S, r, O, or -er, -ing, -ed – was distinct from the other and could not be reduced to any other part. On this account, the relation of knowing between the subject and the object must be immediate and direct. Further, following the American New Realists, Anderson argued that the logic underlying such an epistemology was the doctrine of external relations, viz. in any relationship a/R/b, the terms of the relationship ‘a’ and ‘b’ exist independently of each other and of the relation ‘R’ between them. On Anderson’s view, to attempt to identify the relations a thing has with the things themselves is to commit the error of relativism. On this view, any attempt to identify or reduce the relation of knowing to the subject, or the object, is to render knowledge of either impossible as it fails to maintain the distinctness of the various parts of the relationship of knowledge. A further implication of this view for Anderson is that the qualities of either the subject or object cannot be constituted by the relations that it has. There is, then, an absolute distinction between qualities and relations. Again, to attempt to identify or reduce the qualities that a thing has with the relations that the qualities have is to commit the error of relativism. This criticism of relativism is the most common technique used in the exposition Anderson’s systematic Realist philosophy.
