在私有化之前，智利的电力生产是由一家垂直整合的垄断公司完成的。高输配电损耗和停电是司空见惯的。有监管机构，但在政治上并不独立。政府被要求向该部门提供巨额补贴，以确保其继续存在。在大约1970年代，这个数字达到了大约2亿美元的水平。智利在电力私有化之前进行了精明的管理改革，因此，当1986-1989年期间电力私有化开始时，已经有了管理发电、输电和配电的体制框架。这些监督职责将由一个名为CNE的特殊监管机构来履行。此外，打破垂直整合的垄断，形成价值链上规模较小的服务提供商，也促进了竞争。这意味着要有独立的发电、输电和配电公司。私有化后，智利的电价是根据用户规模来调控的。经销商被允许与大型消费者自由谈判价格，需求超过2兆瓦。小用户的价格由CNE来控制，作为保护那些没有巨大经济影响力的人的福利的一种手段。智利的电力私有化提高了效率，提高了服务质量，降低了价格。1981年消费者的成本高于1989年的水平，这表明效率的提高转移到了消费者身上。随着私有化的到来，电气化运动获得了动力，到1989年，97.9%的城市家庭和62%的农村家庭用上了电。会议的结论是，智利电力部门所有利益攸关者所获得的利益应归功于管理改革，而不是私有化本身。
英国经济学essay代写:智利电力
Before Privatisation, electricity generation in Chile was done by a vertically integrated monopolistic company. High transmission and distribution losses, and power outages were commonplace. There was regulatory agency, but it was not politically independent. Government was required to provide enormous subsidies to the sector to ensure its continued existence. This figure reached levels of approximately US 200 million, at about the 1970s.Chile astutely undertook regulatory reforms prior to electricity Privatisation, so that when it came on-stream between the 1986-1989 period, there was already the institutional framework in place to govern generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. These oversight duties were to be performed by a special regulatory body called the CNE. In addition, competition was encouraged by breaking up the vertically integrated monopoly into smaller service providers along the value chain. This entailed having separate companies for generation, transmission and distribution.Post-Privatisation, electricity prices in Chile were regulated based on customer size. Distributors were allowed to freely negotiate prices with large consumers, with demand of more than 2 megawatts. Prices for smaller users were regulated by the CNE, as a means of protecting the welfare of those without tremendous economic clout. Electricity Privatisation in Chile led to efficiency gains, improved service quality and reduced prices. The cost to consumers in 1981 was more than the level at 1989, suggesting that efficiency gains were passed onto consumers. The electrification drive gained momentum with the advent of Privatisation, such that, by 1989, 97.9% of Urban Households and 62% of rural ones had access to electricity. It was concluded that the benefits accruing to all stakeholders in the electricity sector of Chile were attributable to regulatory reforms, as opposed to Privatisation itself.